Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Is it rational to believe that Jesus was raised from the dead?


“Miracles, indeed, would prove something,” says the skeptic in Alciphron, “but what proof have we of these miracles?”

   Jesus Christ’s resurrection is probably the most important historical claim of all time.  One could definitely argue that Jesus Christ was the most important figure in all of history.  As historian and atheist H.G. Wells claims, “I am an historian, I am not a believer, but I must confess as a historian that this penniless preacher from Nazareth is irrevocably the very center of history.  Jesus Christ is easily the most dominant figure in all history.”  So, the natural question facing us is this—did this man really rise from the grave?  It is my position that, although one can’t know historically whether or not Jesus rose from the dead, one can be rationally justified in believing that He did rise.  

   There are many issues related to this.  First, is there any basis for philosophically rational miracles?  Second, did Jesus exist?  Third, what can we learn about the documents that claimed Jesus’ resurrection occurred?  Fourth, what is the evidence for the empty tomb?  Fifth, what are some criticisms of this evidence?  Sixth, which explanation for Jesus’ resurrection is the best one? 

     In this post, we’ll deal with the first question—that is, the philosophical issues related to the resurrection. 
 
   Most modern problems for conservative Christianity are mounted from skepticism and based on a healthy dose of naturalism.  Skeptics assume that the resurrection was mythological—they claim that this presumption is warranted based on our prior experience of “the way things are.”  David Hume, and more recently Bart Ehrman, have famously argued that it is irrational to believe in miracles because they are the least likely events possible.  Ehrman’s argument goes:
1.      By definition, a miracle is the most improbable of events; the probability of a miracle is infinitesimally remote.
2.      A historian can establish only what likely happened in the past.
3.      A historian can never establish that a miracle happened.
It’s assumed within this argument that miracles are violations of natural law.  However, there is a problem with this since no real definition for natural law exists that is accepted across the board.  Philosopher and atheist J.L. Mackie defines natural law as, “The laws of nature … describe the ways in which the world—including, of course, human beings—works when left to itself, when not interfered with. A miracle occurs when the world is not left to itself, when something distinct from the natural order as a whole intrudes into it” (Mackie 1982: 19–20).  However, some philosophers go further, claiming that miracles require some kind of “Deity” to act.  Hume argued that a miracle was an event brought about by a “Deity.”  

  It should be noted that, in the classical approach to apologetics, the resurrection comes after the existence of God is discussed.  It is really pointless to try to convince an atheist that Christ did in fact raise from the dead—because they reject the idea that any miracle can occur.  (It would be like trying to convince them that Heaven is a real place.)  The only way that anyone can effectively judge the validity of any miracle is to be open-minded on the question of God’s existence.  If this prerequisite is not met, then you will get nowhere.  So, as an open-minded individual, please read my three objections to the skeptic’s argument.

1) Begging the question

  As C.S. Lewis famously pointed out, this argument begs the question because it assumes that the “natural laws” have never witnessed a miracle.  If, for example, miracles occurred as frequently as the Bible claims that they did, then it would seem that Hume’s standard of “natural laws” allows that miracles have happened.  This would mean that miracles aren’t really violations of this “natural law.”  Thus, the argument begs the question since it assumes that no miracles have ever occurred.  In other words, for Hume to be right, he would have to know that there had been no miracles ever.  So the argument is circular.  

2) Probability and reality

   Another problem for this argument is that probability doesn’t describe reality—reality is not linear.  For example, what was the probability that the Holocaust would occur?  Based on Hume’s standards, since it had never happened before, it should never have happened.  But it did.  All of history works this way—the most probable thing to happen does not translate well to what really does happen.  Let’s go back even further—atheists claim that abiogenises occurred without any outside source of intelligence.  But one estimate of the probability of this occurrence is 1x1090,000.  Of course, this is literally impossible—so, improbability does not apply to reality.  

3) Certainty and epistemology

  Certainty cannot be a base for an epistemology (being a system of thought) on Hume’s skepticism.  Hume clearly argues that miracles categorically did not happen.  We already saw that this is circular.  However, a larger problem exists—mainly the idea that “it cannot happen” is not epistemic.  This is why it is completely unjustifiable to base a whole worldview, that is naturalism, on the idea that miracles cannot happen. 

Finally, after looking at the facts, it seems that there is no inherent rationale for a naturalist’s skeptical basis against miracles. 

Next:  Did Jesus exist?

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