Can a Good God exist? An Atheist and a Christian Debate the Problem of Evil (4)

   In my third response to the Worrywart, I would like to synthesize the issues in this debate, focus on issues that are directly related to the subject of our debate and weed out the ones that have little or no meaning to our discussion.  While most of the issues involved in this debate are important, some of them are only of subsidiary importance to the bigger issues.  I believe that a few over-arching ideas need to be addressed before jumping into specific responses. 

  First, since the Worrywart is asserting that the Problem of Evil proves that God doesn’t exist, the burden of proof is on him to prove that his arguments are valid.  I don’t have to prove anything—I merely have to rebut his arguments in order for the theistic position to succeed.  And if both of his arguments (the logical and evidential problems of evil) are rebutted, my opponent loses this debate, regardless of anything else that occurs in this debate. 

 Second, this debate is centered on logic—if an argument is irrational or invalid, then it should be discarded regardless of the emotional baggage attached to it.  So, with these issues cleared up, let’s jump in. 

I) Logical Problem of Evil  

  In my last response, I pointed out that the logical problem of evil is no longer considered valid by the vast majority of philosophers and that the argument itself has been sufficiently answered by Platinga’s Free Will Defense.  With a few reservations, the Worrywart seemed to agree with Daniel Howard-Snyder that the logical problem of evil can be thrown in the “dustbin of history.” 

  However, the Worrywart still questions why God created at all—arguing that God in His perfection wouldn’t have to create a world that allowed evil into the universe.  He argues,

“The Charger makes X represent no creation (nothing) while Y represents creation (something) but that is an error. The fact is that X represents no creation (no evil) plus God while Y represents creation (some evil) plus God. So one is not comparing nothingness to something rather one is comparing something (only God, who is perfect goodness) to something else (God and creation, which means some evil).”

  The Worrywart must assume that there is no “greater good” achieved by the evil in this world.  This assumption has not been proven—it’s quite possible that, through free will, humans can achieve a much greater good.  So this whole objection hinges on my opponent’s ability to prove that there is no “greater good” achieved by free will. 

  Also, it’s unclear to me how one can put a meaningful value on a non-action.  The whole point of my argument was that it is impossible to value X in any sense—can a parent go back and put a value on not having a child?  As humans, we like to say that we wish something had happened differently, but putting that wish into a meaningful value system is usually impossible. 


   So the logical problem of evil, as of right now, has been put to rest like horse with a broken leg. 

II) The Evidential Problem of Evil

  Now for those of you who may have forgotten what the evidential problem of evil is, I’ll give a brief explanation.  The evidential problem suggests that there is “seemingly gratuitous” evil in this world and that the result is that God probably doesn’t exist.  Unlike the logical problem of evil, the evidential problem only tries to prove that God probably doesn’t exist. 

   I have made two general responses to the evidential argument.  First, I argued that there can be no standard for how much evil is “too much” evil.  Second, I argued that, as human beings, we can’t make a judgment call on things we don’t understand. 
 
How much is too much?

  The Worrywart tried to refute my argument by pointing out that his argument doesn’t deal with the quantity of evil but rather the quality of the evil.  Further, he argued that “it was inaccurate because I never said there was ‘too much’ evil rather what I said was that the Charger must, ‘explain how all the seemingly obvious pointless and gratuitous suffering in the world is compatible with their conception of God as all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good.’  So one can see that what I said about the suffering in the world is a lot of it is seemingly gratuitous. I never made a claim that there was too much evil but rather that much of it seems pointless.” 

  So, my opponent claims that there is “seemingly gratuitous” suffering in the world.  (And really what is the difference between “gratuitous” and “too much”?)  However, this only further exasperates the issue—after all, what does “seemingly gratuitous suffering” mean?  Does it mean “seemingly gratuitous suffering” to an atheist who doesn’t want to believe in God or to a Christian who does?  I seriously doubt that the theist and the atheist would agree on what is “seemingly gratuitous.” 

  This is exactly what I mean when I say “if an atheist wants to make a claim like this, he or she must provide a justifiable value standard—otherwise the claim has no bearing on God’s existence.”  Until some kind of value standard, or definition, of “seemingly gratuitous suffering” can be provided, the argument is inherently weak.

CORNEA

   The Worrywart responds, “Unfortunately while there is certainly truth to the fact that our lives are quite limited the fact is that those limitations exist for both sides of this argument. Just as he tells me I can’t infer that there are no caterpillars in the garden merely because I can’t see them neither can he infer that there are caterpillars in the garden despite the fact that we can’t see them. If we are too limited to make judgments upon the quantity and usefulness of evil then likewise we are too limited to make judgments concerning the existence of some ultimate good behind those evils.”

   I completely agree that neither the Worrywart nor myself can know the extent or value of good or bad.  Since we both agree on this, the Worrywart’s argument falls flat because it must prove that there is “gratuitous” evil.  Since I’m not trying to prove that God exists, based on the amount of good, then I really don’t have a problem.  Thus, it would seem that the evidential problem of evil is essentially dealt with. 

Burden of Proof

  The Worrywart claims, “The fact is that the theist has no answer to the evidential problem of evil…The theist has no good reason to believe what she believes at this point rather what she has is faith and a desire for it to be true.”

  Remember at the beginning of this post, I argue that the Worrywart is the one who must support his arguments with solid proof.  However, the Worrywart quite often dips into claiming that “the theist must demonstrate that there is absolutely NO pointless or gratuitous suffering.” 

  However, my opponent hasn’t ever proven that there is such a thing as “gratuitous” evil.  He merely asserts it and then claims that the theist must provide a good reason for it.  This commits two logical fallacies at the same time:  First, it is circular; he supports his argument by claiming that there is gratuitous suffering, which he never proves.  Second, it’s an argument from ignorance, because he asserts that his argument is true until proven false.  Clearly, the theist doesn’t have to provide a “good reason” for all of the evil in the world until the atheist provides a equitable standard for “gratuitous” suffering.  It would be like the theist claiming that there is God exists until the atheist disproves God.

III) Theodicies

  Before responding, I’d like to remind my reader of what a theodicy is.  A theodicy is a justification for the acts of God—however, it’s obvious that no theodicy needs to be provided if there are no valid objections to God based on evil.  So, unless my opponent can resurrect the evidential or the logical problem of evil, his case is lost.  Think of the theodicies as a response to the general problem of evil. 

  I also wanted to note that different theodicies are attempting to prove different things—many of the responses I provided are logically possible, which is all that is necessary.  Remember, if it is suggested that something is seemingly contradictory—such as free will, heaven and hell, and whether God has free will—then all that is necessary is to provide a logically possible answer.  So with that in mind, I’ll respond to my opponent’s objections to my theodicies. 

Free Will Defense

  I’ve split the issues into their respective areas—the free will defense and the free will theodicy are different theodicies and require differing levels of proof.  So the issues that deal with the defense will be dealt with here.  The Worrywart argues that my whole response is dependent on this argument—however, my opponent seriously underestimates the other issues involved. 

God and Free Will

   The Worrywart has argued that God doesn’t have free will because His perfection demands that He act a certain way.  As I argued previously, as long as a logically possible solution is provided, the issue is averted.  I’ve yet to see how my refutations aren’t “logically possible.”  It is logically possible that a being cannot create other free beings that always do what is right, while at the same time, having free will itself.  It’s also logically possible that God cannot actualize a world where people have “perfect free will.”  Since there are many issues involved in the third and final response—and because I have two successful refutations—I’ll drop it for now. 

  The Worrywart also argues that I create a necessary link between evil and free will—but I don’t.  I merely argue that according to my definition of free will it is impossible to create people who always do right—if they did their lives were determined in this way they wouldn’t have free will. 

   The next two examples are almost completely theological—not from my own desire—but because The Worrywart has provided Biblical examples, which supposedly contradict my argument.  So my responses will be theological. 

Heaven

  I suggested that it is logically possible that God will overwhelm us with His presence and that our desire to sin will no longer matter as long as we’re with God.  The Worrywart asked “why didn’t God do this on earth?”  I argued that God would be essentially raping us.  What I mean is that if God forces His presence on us, then we have no choice in the matter.  He would be forcing His love on us.  What is the difference between this and rape?  Doesn’t a rapist force himself on a victim?  Obviously, it’s not rape if the other person consents—thus, if we choose with our free will to be in the presence of God, then we’ve accepted His gift. 

   The Worrywart provides some examples that he claims provide proof that God has been in the presence of people.  I’ll respond to each on a case by case basis. 
 
Adam and Eve

   The simple response is that they weren’t in God’s presence when they sinned.  Genesis 3:8 clearly shows that God met with them at specific times in the Garden of Eden, but that He didn’t reside there.  So, unlike heaven, the Garden of Eden wasn’t always in the presence of God.  And one of the stipulations of my argument was that in order for our sinful desires to be dealt with, we must always be in God’s presence.  Think of God like a breathing apparatus—as long as we’re with Him we no longer sin, but as soon as He leaves we are no longer “overwhelmed.”   

Satan

  The “person” of Satan is definitely an interesting case because he was in God’s presence when he disobeyed God.  This issue is hard to deal with theologically, because the Bible doesn’t talk about it very much.  However, I think one can argue theologically that God gave all angels a one-time choice to rebel or to stay with Him.  Satan and one third of the angels chose to rebel (Rev. 12:4).  This decision was a one-time opportunity and couldn’t be changed (1 Tim. 5:21).  So, while they may have been in God’s presence, He took away His influence.

Paul and Moses

  In all of the cases where God appeared to man on earth, man did eventually sin.  But if you remember, my argument suggested that we no longer have a desire to sin only when we’re continually in God’s presence.  So like the breathing apparatus—when God’s gone, we no longer have protection. 

Hell

   The Worrywart then asks whether people have free will in hell.  The answer, from the perspective of most theists is yes.  The Worrywart essentially asks whether these people can’t leave hell.  I would point out that free will doesn’t allow us to do the impossible.  We can’t fly here on earth.  We can’t disappear here on earth.  In hell, we no longer have the ability to choose Christ.  Indeed, the Bible makes it clear that the only sin that damns is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Mark 3:28-30, Matthew 12:31-32).  Matthew makes clear that the sin will not be forgiven “in the ages to come.”  Also, Luke 16:26 makes it clear that a great chasm has been fixed between heaven and hell—making it impossible for anyone to go from one place to the other. 


Free Will Theodicy

  The Free Will Theodicy is a general theodicy that argues that free will is highly valuable. 

Assorted Examples

  The Worrywart essentially makes two points in this section.  First, he argues that God could have created a better world.  Second, he argues that God should have taught us about disease.

1) God could have created a better world. 

  The Worrywart gives many different examples—for which I provided answers—but he argues correctly that the bigger issue is whether God could/should have created a better world.  The Worrywart said, “The Charger never actually deals with the point of the examples, which is that God could have done things differently to reduce suffering rather he dismisses these ideas without providing any real reasons as to why he dismisses them.” 

  First, I don’t think God should be blamed for imperfections in the world.  If we really do have free will—and this free will was abused through rebellion against God—then it only makes since that perfection would be limited.  Evil corrupts perfection—both physically and spiritually—so the ultimate result is a world where suffering exists.  Now my opponent would probably respond that this suffering should only apply to ourselves, but, as most experience shows us, evil not only corrupts the evildoer but also many other things.  Think about one person’s decision to play with a lighter.  If the lighter starts a fire, it could kill innocent people, cause economic damage, kill pets and destroy priceless heirlooms.  In the same way, when evil came into the world it corrupted everything, not just the ones who decided to allow it in. 

  Second, the Worrywart likes to claim that God’s only real attribute is “love”.  But God is also just—and according to His justice we should all be destroyed.  Indeed, He could still be all-loving and destroy a rebellious world.  So instead of suffering, it is quite possible, that we’re merely feeling just judgment for our sins.

  But isn’t God no longer all loving?  No.  Any judge is completely right in judging a lawbreaker.  Just because the judge orders the criminal to go to prison doesn’t mean he is bad or that he doesn’t care about the criminal.  In fact, it is because he cares about the criminal that he punishes him. 
 But what about innocent Children?  Suffering exists for whole nations and peoples—and we accept this standard ourselves.  Look at Germany.  We made the whole nation repay us for the World Wars.  

  Second, as a result of the above response, it is quite probable that God did create the optimal world—where there was one language and one color.  And perfect versions of the other things too. 

2) God should have taught us

   The Worrywart argues that God should have taught humanity about viruses and diseases.  I argued that God gave us a world where we’re responsible for our actions and, as a result, we’re able to better understand that decisions have consequences.  The Worrywart responded that there is no connection. 

  The point here is that, if we live in a world where there are no diseases or disasters, then we’re like spoiled rich kids who never really understand that our decisions do matter.  If you think about it, this is the most important lesson God could teach us—the decisions we make here have eternal consequences.  Further, God gave us incredibly adaptable brains that have been able to figure out cures to many diseases. 
 
  I also pointed out that God did give the Jews laws to live by which significantly enhanced their lives.  The Worrywart gives two responses: first, that the Christians rejected the law and second, that these laws were for a few thousand people and not the world.

   The first claim is false.  The Worrywart argues that Paul himself taught that the law should be rejected.  This is true—but what he clearly meant was that the law should be rejected as a way of being spiritually justified.  The law no longer was able to justify a person before God—thus spiritually it was useless.  Some passages seem to prove that Paul was totally against the law, but Paul argues throughout the scriptures that people should follow their convictions. 

   The second claim is also false because many different cultures have dietary laws, which are very much like the Jewish ones.  Muslims have dietary laws that are very similar to the Kashrut.  Both Hinduism and Jain preach vegetarianism, which is definitely healthier then most red meat cultures.  One could argue that God provided all cultures with a good idea of what actions, foods and laws should be followed.  Like the moral law, most cultures have similar laws and practices.  This very well might be the hand of God. 

  The Worrywart finally drops into a long litany of anti-Christian comments that have absolutely no bearing on this discussion.  Though I’ll happily discuss them in their own category.

God’s Responsibility

  The Worrywart, “I point out that God as the one who gave humanity it’s free will bears part of the responsibility for what humanity has done with its free will especially knowing what we would do with it.”  I responded that man doesn’t have to abuse his free will—that he chooses to of his own free will.  The Worrywart responds, “First this statement seems to contradict an earlier point of the Charger’s. If one goes back to the Charger’s (Plantagia’s) argument about it being impossible for God to create humans with free will who would not at some point sin then clearly humanity did, in a sense, have to abuse his free will.” 

  Again, man didn’t have to abuse his free will—but God cannot create creatures who are free and don’t abuse their free will.  The point of Platinga’s argument is that God cannot create free beings that only do right. 

  The Worrywart also argues that God is like a parent who should run out into the street after us and stop us from getting hit by the car (evil).  However, I pointed out that we’re cognitive beasts—we can make decisions on our own.  It would be kind of odd for a cognitively able adult to run out in the street with his old parent wheeling after him in her wheelchair.  God’s done more than this—He’s provided us with brains that tell us that we shouldn’t run out in the street.  But what of children in this world, or people, who cannot make cognitively responsible decisions?  Guess what, we do have parents or even strangers (imagine that), who will run out in the street after us. 

The Value of Free Will

   I argue that free will is highly valuable.  The Worrywart argues that, “And it’s important to understand that not having free will as the Charger defines it would not make me or anyone else some sort of electronic robot.  Now a deterministic world (one without evil and suffering) would not be a world where people are paralyzed or where God would control their motor actions.” 

   This is simply wrong—libertarian free will says that person X always has the ability to choose from multiple alternatives.  The idea is that nothing is determined.  So in every situation, X has the ability to choose from several options.  Obviously, the opposite of libertarian free will is determinism, which asserts that every decision is determined based on something else.  Thus, the Worrywart is completely wrong—without free will, every action is predetermined. 

  I just want to remind the reader that, without free will (as mentioned above), every decision is meaningless to them.  You have no real decisions.  Thus, the things that make your life meaningful, like family, marriage, a job and a bank account, are all predetermined.  You’re no longer the product of your decisions—you’re the product of someone else’s.  This is why I say that our actions make us who we are. 

  The Worrywart asserts that science is constantly proving that we are the products of our environment.  However, the nurture vs. nature issue is much too in-depth to discuss right now.  Needless to say, many scientists and philosophers disagree.

  Finally, the Worrywart asserts that some people have more free will than others.  This assertion is simply absurd.  Everyone has the same amount of free will.  I have the exact same amount of free will as a girl from China: she can choose to run away, kill her captors or any number of other things.  She makes the choice to breathe, just like I do.

Jesus’ Death

  The Worrywart asserts that this section is theological and that I have never proven that Christ was raised from the dead.  Both of these statements are true.  However, if Jesus did rise from the dead, then He provides an answer to each and every “personal problem of evil.”  My opponent always wants to bring this away from the “gymnastics” of theoretical answers—this is exactly what Jesus did.  Romans 5:8 says, “[B]ut God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us.”  The beginning of John 3:16 can be translated, “For this is how God loved the world.”  How?  Well, God couldn’t destroy our free will, so He sent His only Son to die and give us a way out from under sin’s destruction.  John 15:13, “Greater love has no one than this, that he lay down his life for his friends.”  So this is the personal answer to why God allows suffering—while He may not be able to stop us from suffering do to our own decision, He came and suffered for us on the cross and gave us the greatest possible love.
 
Animal Suffering and Natural Evils

  The Worrywart asserts that this is one of the most important issues—so I’ll focus all of my energies on this point.  I first answered the Worrywart by claiming that human rebellion caused animal suffering.  The Worrywart suggests, “There is no logical or necessary connection between human beings making wrong moral choices and animals suffering or the occurrence of natural evils (most).” 

  First, almost all animal suffering is in a category of its own.  Think about it—for every deer that’s killed, there’s a very happy mountain lion or wolf.  (It’s almost like fans of opposing teams who pray that the other team will lose.)  The deer “prays” every night that a nice plant awaits its consumption, while the mountain lion “prays” for a large plump deer.  Logically speaking, for every animal that is killed by another animal, there is enough survival made up from the predator that, in the big picture, the equation comes out as zero.  However, this might not be the case if the mountain lion is merely having a snack!

  One must also remember that animals make decisions.  They decide to go to a river where it is likely that a predator would be.  It’s not like animals don’t know the threats of the world.  A school of fish probably doesn’t go and swim around a whale for fun—they know better, they’ve been taught better by God.

  Second, I frankly don’t understand natural evils as a category of evils (at least not in the same sense as moral evils)—it’s really just suffering.  If a hurricane doesn’t land anywhere or kill anyone at sea is it morally evil?  If it lands all of a suddenly it becomes evil—but how is the death of a person morally evil?  If someone dies of natural causes is this morally evil?  No, it’s a tragedy (suffering), but it’s not morally evil.  Certainly it is true that sad events occur—the Japan earthquake and tsunami for example—but it’s unclear how this event was a priori evil.  

  If we correctly understand natural “evils” as events that may cause suffering, then there are many possible answers to the issues mentioned.  First, it’s possible that many kinds of natural evil allow for greater good in the long run.  Forest fires, for example, are very important for the cycle of life in the forests.  In fact, the Sequoias in California require fires in order for their seeds to germinate—as a result, park rangers start controlled fires.  In the long run, the fires allow for more life than before.  Also, it would seem impossible to prove that most natural “evils” don’t in the long run bring about some form of greater good for a habitat. 

  Second, many of the natural “evils” are the result of human action such as pollution.  The claimed global warming—which is unscientific—is said to be the result of human pollution.  Indeed, it would seem impossible to prove that many natural disasters aren’t the result of human actions. 

  Third, the Worrywart hasn’t responded to the claim that evil corrupts more than just morality. 

  But what of all of the tragedies/sufferings that “fall through the cracks?”  I still believe my answer above applies—especially since no real refutation of my argument has been mounted.  It’s quite possible that human moral evil destroyed our perfect world. 

  The Worrywart again asserts that we cannot accept the Genesis account of the Garden of Eden.  But the problem here is that my opponent is essentially committing the fallacy of straw-man here.  If my opponent wants to prove that western theism (monotheism) and evil, or any monotheistic religion, are incompatible, he must take the religion as a whole.  The Worrywart is twisting monotheism in order to make it easier to defeat.  If my opponent seriously wants to defeat theism, he must actually take all of theism into account.  It would be like me asserting that atheism isn’t true based on an incomplete picture of atheism.

IV) Naturalism and Good and Evil

  I argued originally that the atheist must also respond to the problem of evil.  The naturalist cannot assert that there is such a thing as evil because it doesn’t exist in naturalism.  Instead, the naturalist argues that there is evil in the problem of evil. 

  First, the Worrywart argues, “Suffering is merely a fact. It is not something that can be denied. If I poke you in the eye it hurts or if I shoot you in the leg you feel pain end of story. Suffering equals pain so less pain is obviously better then more pain.” 

  This misses the issue.  Why is suffering bad?  According to naturalism, suffering is good because it helps an organism to survive.  So how does a naturalist claim that suffering is bad?  

  The Worrywart seems to believe that my response concedes that the problem of evil is valid.  However, if he remembers correctly, this issue was a direct response to the evidential problem of evil, which asserts that God probably doesn’t exist.  I merely pointed out that if “Y” then “X” appears to be true, it isn’t necessarily true if one can bring other evidence to prove that “X” is unlikely. 

  Finally the Worrywart asserts, “The Charger just seems to keep missing the obvious point of the Problem of Evil, it is a problem if and only if there is an all-good and all-powerful God. So it seems the red herring remains, which is unfortunate because I’m just not a big fan of fish.” 

  I do not understand, I admit it.  I don’t understand how my opponent can really claim that raping a thirteen-year-old girl is bad—when his own worldview claims that rape is good because it propagates the race.  My opponent brings a great amount of passion into his responses—which I appreciate—but then he has to walk away and say that it is no longer evil in his view. 

  Douglas Wilson pointed out to Christopher Hitchens that, if you don’t believe that absolute morals exist, then stop acting like you believe in them.  I really don’t understand how the problem of evil would exist if evil doesn’t exist in the first place.  You can sit there and tell me that I can’t explain how God and evil can co-exist (which I’m trying to do).  But you can’t tell me why evil matters so much to atheists who say it doesn’t exist.

Conclusion

  I believe that I have answered all of the Worrywart’s objections.  His arguments have caused me a lot of thought—and caused me to grow intellectually.  However, I believe that the Worrywart’s two arguments have been defeated. 

  I would like to remind my readers that the problem of evil is a rational problem, but becomes emotional all too often.  Indeed, I would say that the issues are so closely related that sometimes they seem like they are the same.  Personally, as someone who has suffered a fair share of pain, I have experienced God as both the logical and emotional answer to the problem of evil.  I join Job when he says, “I know that my Redeemer lives, and that in the end he will stand upon the earth.”  (Job 19:25) 

Can a Good God exist? An Atheist and a Christian Debate the Problem of Evil (3)

   Fyodor Dostoevsky, one of the greatest novelists of all time, wrote The Brothers Karamazov as a response to the pain in the world.  He says, “If you were to destroy in mankind the belief in immortality, not only love but every living force maintaining the life of the world would at once be dried up. Moreover, nothing then would be immoral; everything would be lawful, even cannibalism.”  I believe Dostoevsky was right.  The world would be a different place with no hope—which is why every action committed in this world matters, if only because we all hope.  But let’s take this one step further.  I think Dostoevsky also meant that without choice of immortality  we would no longer have feeling.

  My opponent, The Worrywart, and I are debating the question: “Does the existence of evil disprove the existence of God traditionally defined in the West as all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good?”  [My opponent makes his first argument (here), I gave my first rebuttal (here) and his response is (here)].  There are two basic arguments given in affirmation of the question above—the logical problem of evil (i.e. that the existence of God and evil are logically contradictory) and the evidential problem of evil (i.e. that the amount of evil disproves God).  I’ll address both of them in order. 

I) Logical Problem of Evil:

A word about my duties as a theist: All any theist has to do for the logical Problem of Evil is provide any possible world where God could be justified in allowing evil. As philosopher Kelly James Clark states,

“this purely logical quandary may be resolved without attempting the more ambitious feat of actually discerning God’s intentions for allowing evil…it may employ statements that are not plausible...because the atheologian contends that there is no possible way for God and evil to coexist. All the theist needs to do, to refute the logical problem of evil, it to specify a possible way or a possible state of affairs for evil and God to consistently coexist.”1

 My opponent claims that I’m merely playing word games.  I must admit that if terms are misdefined it does become a word game—I’m not suggesting that my opponent meaningfully misdefines terms, but rather that these misunderstandings are very prominent in our world.  As a result, we have to be able to create standards of understanding before we can meaningfully deal with the issue.

  Further, as I’ve said before, the logical problem of evil is really not even considered an issue anymore by almost anyone who practices philosophy.  Philosopher Daniel Howard-Snyder said that the logical problem of evil is in “the dustbin of philosophical fashions.”2

  My opponent still has a few objections and I’ll respond to them.  But I believe, and I think my opponent would agree, that we can focus the majority of our time on the evidential problem of evil.  Essentially all of his arguments are against the Free Will Defense.  So I’ll respond to it here. 

1) Free Will Defense:

“Beginning with the second issue I say the free will argument fails because there is no obvious impossibility, logical or otherwise, in the existence of human beings with free will and humans who have the inability to deliberately sin, or at least the inability to commit heinous crimes.  The fact that God by definition is all-good makes logical freedom impossible for him. There is no world in which God could commit a wrong act or make a wrong choice.” – The Worrywart

I have three responses:

A) Created vs. uncreated beings

   Dr. Alexander Pruss argues that it is impossible to create something with free will that only does right, but that it is possible to have an uncreated being with free will that only does good.  He claims:

“If Patricia is a creature who lacks logical freedom with respect to a wholly good life, then by Smith’s definition either it is a necessary truth that if Patricia exists, Patricia leads a wholly good life, or it is a necessary truth that if Patricia exists, Patricia does not lead a wholly good life.  For concreteness, take the first case: that Patricia exists entails that Patricia leads a wholly good life.   (The other case can be handled in exactly the same way, and the case I am considering explicitly is the one that is more relevant to the problem of evil.)  Then, that God creates Patricia entails that Patricia exists.  Therefore, that God creates Patricia entails that Patricia leads a wholly good life.  But surely that means that Patricia is determined to lead a wholly good life by something external to her, namely by God’s creating her.  Hence, she is not externally free with respect to leading a wholly good life.”3

   Thus we see that it is logically impossible for God to create a contingent being (a created being) with free will that does only good.  Since, if God created her to only live a good life, she would have been predetermined to be only good—thus she could not be free.  But, since God is uncreated, it is not logically impossible for Him to be free to only do good.  So then, it is not logically impossible to have free will that only does right—but it is impossible to create things that have free will that can only do right.  Remember, the theist only needs to prove that it is logically possible that this could be the case, not that it actually is so. 

  It should be noted here that there is nothing logically contradictory in saying that all people could always be doing good freely—since they could always choose to do so of their own free will.  But it is logically contradictory to say that God, being external of them, could cause all of their actions to be good and that the people would remain free. 

B) Logically possible ≠ actualizable

   A second refutation is that necessity cannot translate to contingency—i.e. that God, as a necessary being (a being that has attributes of necessity), cannot create other necessary beings, but could only create the second best thing—a being who is contingent and free.  For example, a necessary being cannot create another necessary being or another omnipotent being or another omniscient being.  That is logically impossible—but it is logically possible that perfect free will (where free will chooses to do only what is right) also cannot be translated to contingent beings.  So, while it may be logically possible for a necessary being to have free will that does only good, it may be unactualizable for Him to translate that to His contingent creations.  William Lane Craig argues thusly,

“…I think it’s dubious that God could create a creature which has the ability freely to choose only the Good. Such an ability seems to belong properly only to a nature which has the property of moral perfection, a property that belongs to God alone. A free being which possesses a nature which is characterized by less than complete moral perfection (N.B. that moral perfection differs from mere innocence!) lacks the power to choose infallibly the Good. For God to create a being which has the ability to choose infallibly the Good would be, in effect, to create another God, which is logically impossible, since God is essentially uncaused; and, of course, omnipotence does not entail the ability to bring about the logically impossible.”

C) Morality is a virtue not a duty

   William Lane Craig offers another refutation—mainly that God’s goodness is a virtue rather than a moral duty.   Instead of claiming that God is all-good, in the sense that He has a duty of always being good (stated another way that He commands Himself to do good), one could say that God does good because it is His virtue to do so.  Which would mean that God’s goodness no longer commands Him to act in a certain way—rather it is His virtue that causes Him to act.  For it would be impossible for a omnipotent being to command itself to act. 

NOTE:  Remember, the theist merely needs to provide a logically possible (non-contradictory) account of how God and evil can exist to avoid the logical problem of evil.  All three of the above responses do so—thus this problem is averted.

D) Free will, natural evil and animal suffering:

    So what does free will have to do with natural evil and animal suffering?  Richard Swinburne argues that human free will requires natural evil (I argued this in the first piece as well) so that people have knowledge of responsibility.  The point is that, if we can do whatever we want without any ramifications, we’ve lost all responsibility.  We would be like rich kids who never knew that our world really mattered and that the decisions about our lives mattered.

   Everything we do changes the world around us: we pollute our world, this affects animals and nature; we kill animals and use nature to grow crops, we destroy nature with machinery of war, etc.  No one can deny that nature is changed on a regular basis by our actions—so what is the extension by claiming that our fall also affected the world?  It’s clear that we ourselves represent the most important part of the world (in the sense that we change it more than anyone else)—so it is completely logical to state that the world’s fallen state is due to our own actions.  As humans go, so goes the whole world. 

  And since it is logically possible that this could be the case, we’ve averted the objection.

E) Why did God create anything?

“So the theist who believes with Plantinga that God will always act to eliminate any evil that does not prevent some greater good must now explain why God created anything at all?  ‘If God is the greatest possible good then if God had not created anything there would be nothing but the greatest possible good. And since God didn’t need to create at all, then the fact that he did create produced less than the greatest possible good…Perhaps God could not, for some perfectly plausible reason, create a world without evil, but then it would seem that he ought not to have created at all…Prior to creation God knew that if he created there would be evil, so being wholly good he ought not to have created.’” – The Worrywart

   The atheist has to assume that one can say that it is better not to create at all—which is impossible, because one would have to prove that X (no creation at all) would have more value than Y (creation).  But it would seem meaningless to suggest that X can have any value since it is nothing (and since nothingness has no properties, it cannot have any property of value).  Thus it cannot be “more valuable” than Y.  But even if it could have value, how can one say that it would have more value without actually being able to experience it?  Of course, one cannot experience nothingness, so it cannot be “more valuable.”  

F) Stephen Law’s “reverse” God is evil claim?

“Perhaps my favorite way to expose the weaknesses of the theists’ response to the logical problem of evil is to point out the fact that almost all the answers they can provide to explain how it is logically possible for an all-good God (also all-powerful, all-knowing) to exist given the evil in this world can also be reversed and likewise used to explain how an all-evil God (also all-powerful, all-knowing) exists given the good in this world.” – The Worrywart
  
   It’s unclear how this actually attacks the Christian conception of God.  Because if Christianity is true (and my opponent is assuming so for the sake of his argument), then God came and died for us—definitely not something you would expect from an evil God.  Surely an all-evil God would not suffer in the worst possible way in order to see others suffer.  And if He did come to die in order to create more suffering, why did he provide salvation for some?  Couldn’t He have died without providing salvation?  This conception of monotheism is clearly false.

  Another problem is that good and evil are not analogous.  As Augustine pointed out, evil is not anything but the absence of good.  Professor Peter Williams claims, “Evil is deviation from the standard of goodness, but good is not deviation from some ‘ultimate standard of evil’ Evil must be defined in relation to good, not vice versa, because evil is parasitic upon good. As Aquinas taught, good can exist without evil (cf. God prior to creation) but evil cannot exist in the absence of all goodness (since existence is itself a good thing).”  So then again we see that “evil” doesn’t itself really exist—but is an absence of good.

   Now we come to the bigger issue—the evidential problem of evil.

II) Evidential Problem of Evil

1) How much evil is too much?

“Concerning this section of the Charger’s response there is not much I can say because for the most part he avoids the issue…In his first section titled, “How much evil is too much evil?” he either intentionally or unintentionally avoids the real problem of evil facing the theist (to explain how all the seemingly obvious pointless and gratuitous suffering in the world is compatible with their conception of God as all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good) by changing the topic to issues facing atheists when dealing with definitions of good and evil as well as moral/ethical absolutes. This again all goes back to my initial critic of the fallacy of the red herring.” – The Worrywart

A) Value statement

  The Worrywart is making a value statement—that there is too much evil and that this “too much” evil is evidence against God.  When anyone claims that there is too much of anything, it’s fair to ask “how much is too little” or “what amount makes up a perfect equilibrium?”  There is no difference between the Worrywart’s claim and claiming that $2 is too much for a hamburger—both statements are value statements.  Before anyone can make any value statement they must assume that a standard exists.  I just want to know what that standard is.  Philosopher Peter Kreeft puts it this way, “[It’s] like saying it’s reasonable to believe in God if six Jews die in a Holocaust, but not seven. Or sixty thousand but not sixty thousand and one, or 5,999,999, but not six million...When you translate the general statement ‘so much’ into particular examples like that, it shows how absurd it is. There can’t be a dividing line.”4

    Thus, if an atheist wants to make a claim like this, he or she must provide a justifiable value standard—otherwise the claim has no bearing on God’s existence.  

B) CORNEA

  Another problem that exists for the atheist trying to prove that there is “too much” evil is that no one can make such a normative statement about the world.  Stephen Wykstra provides a devastating critique of the idea that we can assign a “total” value to evil in a specific response to William Rowe’s argument.  The argument goes:

 (C*) H is entitled to infer “There is no x” from “So far as I can tell, there is no x” only if:

It is reasonable for H to believe that if there were an x, it is likely that she would perceive (or find, grasp, comprehend, conceive) it.5

   Stated more simply, if you’re not in a good position to judge the veracity of a statement, you shouldn’t make one.  For example, if you’re blind, you shouldn’t try to explain what a flower looks like.  The same is true for humans who have only existed for a very short time and who cannot possibly make normative statements about the history of good and evil.  The above principle is known as the “nonseeum assumption.”  Professor Nick Trakakis simplifies this by claiming:

“If, for instance, I am looking through the window of my twentieth-floor office to the garden below and I fail to see any caterpillars on the flowers, that would hardly entitle me to infer that there are in fact no caterpillars there. Likewise, if a beginner were watching Kasparov play Deep Blue, it would be unreasonable for her to infer ‘I can’t see any way for Deep Blue to get out of check; so, there is none.’ Both inferences are illegitimate for the same reason: the person making the inference does not have what it takes to discern the sorts of things in question.”6

2) God may have a greater good by allowing things to go as they are

“Then in his second section entitled ‘God may have a greater good by allowing things to go as they are’ he merely restates his idea for solving the logical problem of evil, even weakening it a little by adding the word ‘may.’  He then assumes it is true (God has a good reason for allowing the evil he allows) and then offers two possibilities (free-will and heaven) as to what could be ‘good enough’ to make up for all the evil in this world.” – The Worrywart

This issue is based on the above issue.  It would be hard to provide a reason “good enough” when there is no standard for what “good enough” or “bad enough” even means.  Plus, any objections here will be addressed in the theodicies, which are a response to both the logical and evidential problem of evil.

III) Theodicies

1) Free Will

   The Free Will Theodicy is a response claiming that free will is valuable—thus, it responds to both arguments, but especially the evidential problem.

A) But how can we have free will in heaven and act always right?

“So one must ask is there free will in heaven? If the answer is yes then it seems it is possible for humans to have free will as well as no pain/suffering/evil. So if that is possible why didn’t God just start there in the first place? If the answer is no and free will does not exist in heaven then clearly it is not as valuable as theists claim it is. And one must then ask why it was so valuable to have free will on earth?” – The Worrywart

   I think a theist could argue that our desires in heaven will be “overwhelmed” by our desire to be perfect like God due to our own proximity to God—we will no longer have any desire to sin of ourselves.  This would effectively mean that we’re free but that we will not sin because our sinful desire is no longer predominant. One can see this in a Christian’s life as they grow in their walk with Christ. 

   But why couldn’t God do this on earth?

   If God had “overwhelmed” us on earth, we would have no choice in the matter.  It would be a lot like a man raping any woman he “loved.”  There would be no significant difference between God “overwhelming” us and physical, emotional and spiritual rape.  Of course, God cannot rape us and be all-good—thus He didn’t force himself on us. 

   Also, one could use the analogy of the potter.  The theist could claim that external circumstances guide us.  Like a potter, God could be sitting in heaven taking the raw products that we are and, assuming we agree to allow Him to touch our lives, shape us into beautiful creatures that will perform perfectly in heaven. 

B) Assorted examples

The Worrywart gives two basic kinds of examples:

First, God could have created a world where…

   The Worrywart claims that God could have created all humans with the same language, color, strength, sexuality, perfect morality and no need for food without destroying free will.  Needless to say, most humans find great pleasure in sex and food—so these two examples probably should be withdrawn.  As for the same skin color—there are good survival reasons for our differing skin colors.  Darker-skinned people are better adapted to more sun exposure and lighter-skinned people are more adapted to higher climates.  And I don’t think that we can blame God for racism.  I think the strength issue is a side issue—more related to childbearing and socially assigned roles.  I think different languages provide incredible beauty.  And, as a poet, I’ve discovered the “untranslatable” beauty of words can be an ocean of beauty.

Second, God should have taught us…

“…what he ignores is the fact that they did not know that at the time and God never told them. All God had to do was tell people what viruses were and how they spread and then tell them the things they should do to help avoid becoming sick.” – The Worrywart

We can remember Richard Swinburne’s argument here, which primarily said that God created a world where responsibility was a big deal—where every action meant something.  Also, God has provided many dietary, physical and other helpful laws, which if used would fix many problems.  A few examples:

·    Carrion is not to be eaten (Leviticus 7:24)
·    The examination and cleansing of objects known to have come into contact with infectious persons, and their destruction if they are unable to be cleansed (Leviticus 13)
·    The quarantine and routine inspection of those suffering from infectious diseases, and the washing or destruction of objects touched by that individual while infected (Leviticus 13, 14)
·    Dwellings known to be infected with mold are to be repeatedly cleansed and examined until the mold has been completely removed, persons in the dwelling to wash themselves and their clothes, any physical material in the house which carries the mold is to be disposed of outside the residential area (and replaced with new material), and if the dwelling cannot be cleansed or if the mold keeps reoccurring the entire dwelling is to be destroyed and the debris disposed of outside the residential area (Leviticus 14)
·    Men and women with abnormal genital discharges were to wash themselves and their clothes, if they touched anyone or anything without washing their hands that person or thing had also to be washed (Leviticus 15)
·    Cleansing rituals involved washing with running water, avoiding the danger of stagnation and the transmission of infection by contaminating a static body of water with unclean material (Leviticus 15)
·    Those in contact with a dead body to wash themselves and their clothes, and any open container which was in a room where a person had died was to be considered unclean, together with its contents (Numbers 19:11-20)
·    Latrines to be dug well clear of residential areas (Deuteronomy 23:12-13)7

   But why didn’t God miraculously tell people to stop doing what’s physically harmful all of the time?  It’s unclear whether people would listen to Him—as is the case with Sodom and Gomorrah, God promised wrath against the physical sins of the people.  But no one listened to Him.  Most people also didn’t listen when God warned them before the flood.  If they didn’t listen to Him than, why would they listen to Him now? 

  Also, God clearly gave us rational minds—and, in some of the cases, the provided rationality was simply not used by us.  I think that the rationality that God has given us has brought us education and health for the most part.  In those cases there is gross human irrationality, God certainly cannot be blamed for man’s irrationality. 

  Further, Steven Wykstra’s response is useful here.  (Remember his claim was that we cannot state that something probably does not exist if we probably don’t know all of the facts.)  We simply cannot make probabilistic claims about how God did act in the past in educating us.

C) Is God responsible for our misuse of free will?

“Further when using the free will argument on the problem of evil one must also address what responsibility God would have in making sure we do not abuse or misuse the free will he gave us.  The fact is that if free will is a gift provided by God and he knew exactly what we would ‘choose’ to do with it then as the giver of the gift he does bear part of the blame for the evils that have been committed due to the use of our free will.” – The Worrywart

   This confuses the issue.  Man didn’t have to abuse free will—he did so of his own free will.  Thus, God cannot be blamed for it.  The Worrywart further argues that parents are responsible for their children.  However, this example fails because it assumes that we have no cognitive ability to decide what is wrong or right.  This is clearly false—for if it were so, then we wouldn’t know what is “evil” or what is “good” and the Worrywart wouldn’t be able to make this argument.

D) Were Adam and Eve free?

“It’s also fun to note that the piece of fruit Adam and Eve were not supposed to eat was the fruit of the ‘knowledge of good and evil’ meaning that before they ate it they could not know what was good (obey God) and what was evil (disobey God). God again withholds knowledge so really what did he expect? – The Worrywart

God most assuredly didn’t “withhold knowledge.”  If He had, He wouldn’t have allowed Satan into the garden.  Satan convinced Eve to sin—she accepted, that is all.

E) Is free will valuable?

“The part the Charger fails to mention is that with the second option you get a life free of pain and suffering where you wouldn’t have missed free will because you wouldn’t have known anything different. It seems like a detail worth mentioning because unlike him I would guess the exact opposite that if you go throughout history and offer people the world as is with all the pain and suffering they experience but their free will intact verses a world with no pain and suffering but only the illusion of free will a majority of people will take the later. I would.” – The Worrywart

Is Free Will valuable?  I think that this question needs to be considered for a moment.  My opponent suggests that he, and most people, would rather have a world without free will.  I think this statement is rather meaningless because, in essence, he is saying that he would no longer be an atheist (he would electronically do what God wanted him to do).  By extension, we also wouldn’t be debating this or any issue.  Everyone would also forfeit any kind of feeling—for feeling comes from making the right or wrong decision to act.  (Remember what Fyodor Dostoevsky said.)  In fact, you would no longer exist—you wouldn’t even be able to have basic brain functions, God would control them all.  I think most people think a deterministic world is one where they are paralyzed and that God merely controls their motor actions—this is not the way it would be because you would have no consciousness (since you stopped being anything).  In our western culture, our actions make us who we are.  Thus, it would seem that we should value our free will as much as we value ourselves.

F) Free will and Christianity?

“It is also worth noting that the free will argument is a fairly new argument historically speaking and has little to no scriptural support. For most of history God’s sovereignty has always taken precedence of any concept of human freedom.” – The Worrywart

    First, this is completely historically inaccurate—predestination simply did not exist in the church until Augustine (he got the idea from his Gnostic days) and was by no means “accepted” or ever has been.  True, the Protestant reformation placed an emphasis on this idea—but Catholics never accepted it and, within a few years, Arminius came along and created the Arminian shift in Protestantism that is by far a more popular view.  So, in actuality, free will is the classical belief held by the majority of Christians. 

   Second, Scripture does support Free Will.  Below are just a few verses that show that we have a choice in our actions:  Deuteronomy 30:11 and 15, John 14:15, John 15:7, Romans 2:10, 1 Corinthians 9:24, 1 Timothy 6:12, 2 Timothy 2:21 and 1 John 5:1.

   Also, it is illogical to say that one must “have” faith or “confess” their sins if they’re not free to do otherwise. 

2) God suffered for us

“In this section the Charger offers more theology then philosophy as he himself admits. So the problem is this section offers little to nothing to the unbiased observer trying to make a rational choice about God’s existence based on the problem of evil.” – The Worrywart

The question of evil is a question for both theology and philosophy.  By definition, theology is the study of God, so naturally it plays a role in the discussion.  And theology is just as rigorous as any other study.

A) Did God’s suffering count for us?

“But even for Christians who accept these claims I believe they don’t really solve the problem of evil as the Charger tries to make them. Jesus’ suffering doesn’t erases other people’s suffering rather it merely increases the amount of suffering that has occurred. The idea that a friend of mine suffered through some sort of pain with me does not take away the pain that I myself suffered it merely means they suffered as well.” – The Worrywart

   The point I’m making is not that Christ’s suffering made up for our own, but rather that His suffering means we cannot blame Him for our own suffering.  As I’ve clearly argued above, God cannot do anything to stop our suffering right now without destroying a greater good (free will).  Thus, by coming down and suffering the same as us, He proved that He was good.  Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a Lutheran pastor executed by the Nazis in World War II, said, “God lets himself be pushed out of the world on to the cross. He is weak and powerless in the world, and that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us and helps us... Christ helps us, not by virtue of his omnipotence, but by virtue of his weakness and suffering...Only the suffering God can help.”

   Further, my opponent leaves out the most important part of the equation—i.e. that God obviously wouldn’t have come and died if there was a better option.  And because He’s omniscient, He would know a better option if it existed.  But God didn’t do a greater action.  Thus, God’s action was the only possible one. 

B) Hell?

“Then of course there is the issue of hell. If hell is a place of eternal suffering as traditional Christian doctrine claims then the real problem of evil never actually gets solved it merely gets segregated so that while some people are enjoying the perfect heaven that God for some reason was unable to create originally the majority of humanity is suffering endless torment.  Jesus’ death was clearly limited in its effectiveness. One must again question why God created humanity at all knowing only a small fraction of them would end up ‘choosing’ to follow/obey/love him while the rest of us burned? It again makes God look fairly self-serving.” – The Worrywart

   First, God has no control over whether or not people go to heaven or hell—we’re the ones who control this.  Personal responsibility and justice are at stake here—for if people are given free will throughout life and then all forced to go to heaven, then their choices don’t matter.  Free will only matters if it really matters. 

   Second, God has clearly defined what is required to go to heaven—acceptance of His death and resurrection.  Pascal argued in his famous wager that the possible outcomes make the “God choice” more pragmatically valuable.  And as C.S. Lewis famously argued, those who technically never heard of God still can be saved through their own moral compasses. 

  Third, everyone would agree (at least on earth) that people who commit crimes deserve punishment.  Thus, why shouldn’t people who commit crimes against God be punished? 


C) Animals and natural evil?

“Finally Jesus’ suffering and death also did nothing to address natural evils or animal suffering. It is merely a theological answer to the problem of moral evil.” – The Worrywart

This is not true—because He suffered the pain of everyone (animal and human) regardless of whether it was moral, natural, etc.  He actually suffered every single evil that has happened since the beginning of the world.  So this most certainly applies.  Also, as a result of His action, the world will be perfect—thus, His action does apply.

3)  Animal Suffering

A) Why believe they were herbivores?

“So the most obvious question is what are these good reasons to believe that?  Beyond just animals being herbivores what about the existence of dangerous plants? Did some plants suddenly just turn poisonous?” – The Worrywart

The Bible clearly states that all animals were herbivores before the fall. 

Genesis 1:29-30
“And God said, ‘Behold, I have given you every plant yielding seed which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall have them for food. And to every beast of the earth, and to every bird of the air, and to everything that creeps on the earth, everything that has the breath of life, I have given every green plant for food.’”

Genesis 3:17-19
“And to Adam he said, ‘Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you, “You shall not eat of it,” cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you; and you shall eat the plants of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return.’”

B) What about plants? 

Well, plants simply don’t suffer or, if they do, we just cannot know it—they are either alive or dead.  Since plants don’t have a nervous system, they cannot “feel” pain.  So I don’t think that plants can suffer. 

C) What about germs and viruses?

  I think that the issue is related to the existence of Fungi.  Fungi decomposes dead objects—like trees, grass and other organic materials.  Parasites exist, at least some of them, to keep populations in check.  We certainly wouldn’t want a world with so many cats that there was no room for us.  Other animals also serve this purpose—like foxes, lions and other carnivores. 

D) Historicity of the Garden of Eden and the reality of Satan?

“Now the big problem with this response besides the lack of reasons given for actually believing it is the fact that it requires one to accept the Garden of Eden story as historical rather then mythical and that simply does not work rationally.” – The Worrywart

  Think of the Christian faith as a book.  The Worrywart says that this book and reality are contradictory—and he attempts to prove that it is false by claiming that certain parts of the book (i.e. God and thus Christianity) are false.  But one must take the whole book into account before it can be defeated.  I don’t need to prove that creation happened, that the Garden of Eden was real or that Satan is real; my opponent must assume that it is true in order to argue that Christianity is contradictory. 

  Further, the Worrywart is committing the logical fallacy of straw manning my argument.  That is, he is creating a different version of the theistic belief system, and attacking it.  If he actually wants to prove that it is illogical to believe in God he must do so from the full story.

IV) The problem of good and evil for naturalism

My opponent claims that this whole section is a red herring.  I think there are three reasons why this is not a red herring.  

  First, my opponent must explain how there can be such a thing as suffering in a naturalistic worldview.  I cannot see how a naturalist can explain suffering.  For suffering to exist, there must be something better—but there is no hope or good in naturalism, thus the naturalist must explain where the idea for the existence of suffering comes from.  My opponent claims that I’m confusing natural evils with ethical evils—but I believe my opponent would agree that every death, whether caused by murder or an earthquake, is just as evil.  If one must assume that God exists for suffering to exist, then how can one deny God’s existence?  Let me put it another way—if I claim that good books exist, then I must assume that words, sentences and languages also exist.  My opponent seemingly wants to prosecute God for the crime of allowing evil—when he himself cannot explain why evil exists in a world without God. 

   Second, this response is specific to the evidential problem of evil—which claims that God probably does not exist.  The use of probability means that all “applicable” evidence must be considered.  One popular response is to suggest that, yes, if one just considers evil, one may think that God does not exist, but, based on all of the evidence, it is probable that God does in fact exist.  For example, one can say that if X probably does not exist based on evidence Y, then one could say that evidence U, T, and Z outweighs Y.  This is fully within the rights of the theist—and is considered a canonical response to the problem of evil.  Indeed, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy exposits this as the first defense used by theists against the evidential problem of evil.  So it would seem that it is not a red herring at all—and the atheist must be able to explain the role of evil in a natural world. 

  Third, it’s illogical to say that evil only applies to one side of the issue.  If evil applies to both sides equally, one cannot tout it as evidence against only one side of the issue. As Dr. Terry L. Miethe argues: “The atheist is constantly raising the problem of evil but never gives a solution. It is high time the theist called: ‘Foul!’ I defy the atheist to give an answer to the problem of evil.”9 

William Lane Craig also argues, “if objective values cannot exist without God, and objective values do exist – as is evident from the reality of evil – then it follows inescapably that God exists.”10

   I’m thus waiting for a response to these issues by The Worrywart—since they seem to make God’s existence, based on the problem of evil, exceedingly probable.

Conclusion

  In this post, we’ve delved further into the issues related to the problem of evil.  I believe that the evidence and logic both support the position of the theist.  Remember Dostoevsky’s quote—without God there is no hope and no good, and without free will we can’t know this hope.  I look forward to reading The Worrywart’s response, especially to the evidential problem. 

  Just on a sidenote—I’m having fun.  I love being able to discuss issues like this with intelligent people, and my opponent definitely is very intelligent and knowledgeable, so I hope my readers are having as much fun reading our debate as I am doing it.  I apologize for the length, but the issues we’re dealing with are very important.  Please e-mail or post a link from this and the earlier posts to any friends or family who might benefit or enjoy the debate. 

Humbly yours,
The Charger

1.  Kelly James Clark, Return to Reason, (Eerdmans, 1998), pp.65-66.
2.   Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Evidential Argument from Evil, (Indiana University Press, 1996), Introduction.
3.  Pruss, Alexander R. (2008). The essential divine-perfection objection to the free-will defence. Religious Studies 44 (4):433-444.
4.  Peter Kreeft in Lee Strobel, The Case for Faith, (Zondervan, 2000), p.43.
5.  Wykstra, Stephen J. 1984. “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16: 73-93.
6.  http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/
7.  http://bibleq.info/answer/3125/
8.  http://www.angelfire.com/mi/dinosaurs/carnivores.html
9.  Terry L. Miethe, Does God Exist?, p.192.
10.  William Lane Craig in debate with Kai Nielsen, cf. ‘The Craig-Nielsen Debate: God, Morality, And Evil’ @ http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-nielsen0.html.

Can a Good God exist? An Atheist and Christian Debate the Problem of Evil (1)

   For those of you who may not know, I’m currently in a debate with The Worrywart, an atheist blogger.  We are debating the question: “does the existence of evil disprove the existence of God traditionally defined in the West as all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good?”  My opponent has already posted an opening argument answering the question in the affirmative.  You can read his opening argument at this (Link).  I will negate the question by suggesting that the problem of evil does not constitute evidence that God does not exist. 
 

Opening statement

   I think it can be said that most people want to believe in God—at least they want to believe in a god who gives them what they want when they want it.  As famous Christian philosopher C.S. Lewis said, “What would really satisfy us would be a God who said of anything we happened to like, ‘What does it matter so long as they are contented?’ We want, in fact, not so much a Father in Heaven as a grandfather in heaven—a senile benevolence who, as they say, ‘liked to see young people enjoying themselves’ and whose plan for the universe was simply that it might be truly said at the end of each day, ‘a good time was had by all.’”

  I believe in the existence of Evil and in the existence of God—and I further believe that it is rational to believe in both.  The problem of evil has been considered by many to be the greatest evidence against the existence of a loving God, because it does not make sense to man how the existence of evil and an all-loving being can exist at the same time.  My opponent believes that the existence of evil makes the existence of an all-loving, all-powerful, all-knowing God irrational.  I will first respond to my opponent’s two arguments and then give several responses to the general problem of evil.

   My opponent in this debate, The Worrywart, has given an excellent summary of the problem of evil on his blog.  His research and knowledge of the subject are extensive.  He has defined the classical problem and included some new ideas as well.  I will present a basic outline of his arguments and respond to each of them and then provide several theodicies.  (A theodicy is a justification for the acts of God.)   

  The Worrywart provides two arguments: a deductive argument (that is based on supposedly contradictory statements) and an inductive argument (that is one based on supposed evidence.).

I. The Deductive Argument:

The Worrywart states it like this:

1.    If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.

2.    If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.

3.    If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.

4.    If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.

5.    Evil exists.

6.    If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn't have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn't know when evil exists, or doesn't have the desire to eliminate all evil.

7.    Therefore, God doesn't exist.

That this argument is valid is perhaps most easily seen by a reductio argument, in which one assumes that the conclusion — (7) — is false, and then shows that the denial of (7), along with premises (1) through (6), leads to a contradiction. Thus if, contrary to (7), God exists, it follows from (1) that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. This, together with (2), (3), and (4) then entails that God has the power to eliminate all evil, that God knows when evil exists, and that God has the desire to eliminate all evil. But when (5) is conjoined with the reductio assumption that God exists, it then follows via modus ponens from (6) that either God doesn't have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn't know when evil exists, or doesn't have the desire to eliminate all evil. Thus we have a contradiction, and so premises (1) through (6) do validly imply (7).

Analysis:

1) God does not have to act right now

     Simply put premise six is wrong.  For it assumes that God has to act right now—a good being does not necessarily have to “always” eliminate evil as far as it can right now.  This makes even more sense when you consider that God is not in space and time. He is not spatio-temporal—He exists eternally outside of time.  Thus, He may respond in our future (and His present) and the problem is averted.  Another way of considering this is that time is like a numbered line, but since God exists outside of time, He exists all along the number line—right now, in the past and in the future.  It becomes non-sensical to say that God has to act now, since there exists no “now” outside of time and space.  Thus, the  “contradictory statements” can be avoided.  And, as we will see, the argument can actually work in favor of the theistic worldview. 

   Norman Geisler has reconstituted the deductive argument in such a way that it turns into evidence for the existence of immortality.  He claims that based on the fact that God has not acted against evil yet (but does have to in the future) there will necessarily be a solution to the problem in the future.  In other words, God must act against evil in the future, thus there will be a perfect world.  Now if we accept that God does exist, than we have the solution to the problem of evil in this reconstitution of the argument. 

2) Free will defense

   Premise six is wrong again—for if there is a greater good served by His inaction than this argument is defeated.  Alvin Platinga has suggested that free will is this greater good.  His argument is highly technical and is beyond the length and breadth of this post.  (You can read his argument the highly acclaimed book “The Nature of Necessity”.)  Robert Adams and others (Gutting p. 106, Howard-Snyder & O’leary-Hawthorne p. 1) claim that the majority of philosophers have accepted the validity of Platinga’s defense, and claim that it solves the logical problem of evil.  Even William L. Rowe, who The Worrywart quotes in his post has said, “Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim. Indeed, granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God.” ("The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” APQ 16 (1979) footnote 1, p. 335)

II. Inductive Argument

The Worrywart uses William L. Rowe’s version of the argument:

(1)    There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(2)    An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(3)    Therefore there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

He further claims:

“The evidential problem of evil is the problem that I just don’t see any theistic answer to, the best they can do is side-step the issue or simply throw up their hands and say ‘I don’t know but I still believe.’” 

Analysis:

1)    How much evil is too much evil? 

   The argument above inherently assumes that there is too much evil—but this merely leads one to the question: how much evil is too much evil?  The atheist needs to explain how much evil would constitute a state of equilibrium.  Further, the atheist must here provide some kind of value system for knowing how much evil constitutes a unit of evil.  For example, the atheist would have to assign a value to rape, murder, robbery, sneezing on each other, bad jokes, etc. 

  On a serious note though is one rape as evil as fifty rapes?  What makes something more evil than something else?  Another more pertinent example would be whether the death of an adult is more evil than the death of a child. 

   Since, and I’m assuming that it cannot be done, no value system exists it is meaningless to say that there is too much evil.  Because we don’t know how much evil would constitute equilibrium or how much evil would be less than equilibrium.

2)    God may have a greater good by allowing things to go as they are

     God would not have to theoretically act if something greater were to happen as a result of leaving the equilibrium as it is.  For example, if someone has a tumor that cannot be operated on without a great risk of losing his or her life, doctors might choose to leave the tumor as is for a time.  Maybe the problem of evil cannot be eliminated because a greater good will come from leaving it. 

   What is this greater good?  There are a number of possible reasons.  First, it would be direct violation of free will for God to stop suffering and evil—to me, this would be a much greater evil than letting evil go on unabated, since it would entail the destruction of the world as we know it.  I think if you asked most people if they would rather have evil and the world, or a world where they don’t have a choice they would prefer the first option (I’ll further clarify this argument throughout the debate).

  Second, it might make God’s final plan of heaven impossible.  Indeed, if God created the world knowing that the end result was a perfect heaven where people could only come as a result of living in a evil world—it would seem a greater good that God would allow evil to go on as it is. 

   These then are specific responses to the two arguments.  Now I’ll provide—some justifications for God’s action, or rather inaction. 

III. Theodicies and arguments from probability:

  As I said above, a theodicy is a general justification for God’s action.  There are many different kinds of theodicies out there—some of them more successful than others.  Some like Peter van Inwagen’s try to explain the existence of evil through a narrative, others like Richard Swinburne’s are based on logic.  I will focus on three theodicies: the existence of free will, Jesus’ own suffering for us and animal suffering.  I will also argue that theism is intrinsically probable based on naturalism’s inability to answer the problem of evil. 

1) Free Will

  I have already used part of the free will theodicy, but I will expand and use it as theodicy against all three kinds of evil.  “Free will” is our ability to act freely when presented with any situation that requires a choice—for example, when Adam and Eve were given the choice to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.  This is the essence of free will—that our actions have side effects. 

  Some atheists claim that God should have created a world where there was less evil (i.e. that God could have created a world where we can only do good or where we cannot do as much evil as we do.) 

  But this is based on a common assumption that the omnipotence of God means that God can do anything.  This is not true.  For example, God cannot create round squares or round triangles—He cannot do something that is logically contradictory.  I would also argue here that God cannot create free-willed beings and only allow them to do what is right.  This would be the same as giving you five dollars and telling you that you can do whatever you want with it—and then, whenever you want to spend it on anything I don’t like, I stop you and take the five dollars from you.  This action is necessarily contradictory, thus God cannot do it.  I will probably refer back to this argument as we go forward, so keep it in mind. 

  The theodicy of free will also provides a specific response in cases of non-moral evil.  For example, non-moral evil could have been avoided if someone had acted on their own free will.  Most car crashes could be avoided by more responsible driving or maintenance—indeed, almost all crashes are the result of some kind of irresponsibility.  Even in cases of natural disaster, such as the Black Death humans cannot get an out-of- jail free card.  If people during the fourteenth century had actually cleaned their cities, then they have avoided most of the deaths. How can we blame God for the free actions of others?  As I pointed out above, if God gave us free will and then took it away, it would not be free will. 

  A further point within the context of free will is its response to natural evil.  Richard Swinburne has suggested that natural evils would be the expected result from a fallen world.  He also suggests that if God intervened, He would have created a “toy-world, a world where things matter, but not very much; where [people] can choose and our choices make a small difference, but the real choice remains God’s.” [Swinburne cited by Davies 1998, 171]. 

2) God suffered the same evil as us

    In my eyes, the best answer to the problem of evil is the claim that Christ took on the pain, suffering and sin of the world on the cross.  What this means is that for every E (evil), Jesus suffered the same E on the cross.  This answer is more theological than philosophical, but it does provide an emotional and, I believe, empirical answer to the problem of evil.  For, if Jesus did take all of the pain and evil in the world on His shoulders during His crucifixion, then this would solve the dilemma of the love of God.  For, if He suffered the same things as us than how can we claim that He does not care about us?  

   Further, it would seem logical to say that God did the only thing that He could do.  Why would God die unnecessarily?  If He’s omniscient, then He would know all of the possible solutions to the problem.  Christ’s death on the Cross would have to be the only way in which He could fix the problem—for if there was another way, God would have used it.  We can see this in Jesus’ last prayer at Gethsemane where He says, “Father, if you are willing, take this cup from me; yet not my will, but yours be done.”  (Luke 22:42, NIV). 

  When used with the theodicy that we simply cannot know why evil exists it makes for possibly the best answer to the problem. We can claim that for every E an X exists, which we don’t know, but for every E God also suffered the same E.  Thus the X probably exists. 

3) Animal Suffering

The Worrywart believes that there is no explanation for why animals must suffer.  The Worrywart claims,

“Perhaps the easiest example of pointless evil that no theodicy seems able to address is the existence of animal suffering…Animals existed millions of years before humans and were hunting and killing one another long before we showed up due to the fact that some of them desired the flesh of other animals to eat. Why didn’t God just make all animals herbivores?”

I have three responses: 

A)    God did create herbivores

  There are good reasons to believe that the animals in the Garden of Eden were herbivores.  So this is the way God created the world—then man, as the free moral creature, ate the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil and took away the perfect world.

B)    Two possible causes

There are two possible causes for the fall of animals.  C.S. Lewis suggests that it is the result of Satan.  It also has been suggested that it is the result of man’s fall.  Regardless, the answer is in the next response. 

C)    They will be herbivores again

  It is clear that God will restore a perfect world like that of the Garden of Eden in heaven where animals will be herbivores once again (Isaiah 65:25, Hosea 2:18). 

4) The problem of good and evil for naturalism

  There are two problems for the atheist here.  First, the atheist must assume that God exists to claim that evil exists.  Second, the atheists probably cannot explain the existence of evil in their own worldview.  In this argument, I will suggest that these two issues make theism more probable than atheism—because if the theodicies provided above do explain how God and evil can exist, than these argument will constitute evidence that theism is probably true. 

A) The moral argument

   There exists a large problem for the atheist who suggests that the problem of evil disproves God.  For evil to exist in any kind of absolute form—some kind of creator of absolute moral laws must exist.  It is a contradiction to say that A (being evil) disproves B (God), when the existence of A is contingent on the existence of B.  

  One may object that there is nothing absolute about evil.  But the problem here is that my opponent assumes that absolute morals do exist.  He assumes this when he suggests that Jose Stable was wrong for killing Ulysses.  But if murder weren't inherently wrong, then how can he claim that Ulysses’s death was tragic?  What basis does my opponent have for claiming that Robert Burdick was wrong for raping the sixteen women?  Maybe he was raped as a child.  But no, my opponent suggests that these things are inherently evil—that is that the act of rape is inherently wrong.  As C.S. Lewis points out, “My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust?... Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too—for the argument depended on saying the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my fancies.”

B) Atheism cannot explain evil.

    Even if the problem of evil does not assume that God does exist, there is still a problem for atheists—mainly that the problem of evil also exists for the atheist.  Because atheism must either disprove the existence of evil or explain how evil can epistemically mean anything to mere by products of chance.  For every E (an instance of evil) there must be an X (explanation for E), but it is unclear how E and X can relate in world where E is not even supposed to exist.  In essence I’m arguing that there can be no meaningful epistemic definition of evil in the naturalist state, thus there can be no explanation for the existence of evil.  Because if you cannot define something, you obviously will not be able to explain it. 

   One might ask why the atheist has to do all of this work.  The answer is that atheism is like an enclosed box—if the existence of everything in that box cannot be potentially explained, then the box falls apart.  I would argue that evil represents an example of something that is potentially unexplainable.

  Thus, if this response is true than it makes atheism inherently improbable—thus making theism either more probable or at least as probable as atheism.  And I would argue that the other arguments for God's existence make theism inherently more probable. 

Conclusion

   I believe based on the above evidence that God does exist—and that the problem of evil does not disprove His existence.  I further believe that based on the above evaluation of the Worrywart’s arguments that the more simple answer is that God does exist.  I have made three separate cases in this post, first that both the deductive and inductive argument for God’s existence are not valid and second I have mounted three justifications of God’s actions and an argument for the improbability of the atheist system.  I look forward to the Worrywart’s response.  Feel free to ask questions or make comments about any part of my post or any related issues.

Humbly yours,
The Charger

You can read The Worrywart's response here.

(Part V) Religious Experience and Doctrine

   Over the last month we have taken a fairly in-depth look at religious experience from the perspective of philosophy and apologetics.  Today, we’ll focus on the theological implications of religious experience.  Should religious experience reinterpret doctrine at any level?  Should it change our lives?  And what does the Bible say about it?

  Obviously we wouldn’t have the Bible without religious experiences, because prophecy necessarily comes from religious experience and the Bible was written by prophets.  However, the question remains—“can modern-day people experience the same kind of religious experience as the Biblical writers did?”  The answer is pretty obviously no.  The Bible is absolutely clear on this subject: 

John 14:26 “But the Counselor, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you all things and will remind you of everything I have said to you.”  (NIV)

  Its pretty apparent that John is talking about the Holy Spirit will make clear what Jesus had already said.  W. Hall Harris claims, “…in light of the connection with ‘all the things’ Jesus said to them, it is more likely that the teaching function of the Holy Spirit is not intended to reveal exhaustive truth to the disciples, but rather the full significance of what Jesus did and said while he was with them.”

Hebrews 1:1-3 “In the past God spoke to our forefathers through the prophets at many times and in various ways, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he appointed heir of all things, and through whom he made the universe.  The Son is the radiance of God's glory and the exact representation of his being, sustaining all things by his powerful word. After he had provided purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty in heaven.”  (NIV)

   The point here is that God communicated His Word twice—first through their forefathers and prophets and secondly through His Son.  Adam Clarke says it best, “This Son, in the fullness of time, was manifested in the flesh that he might complete all vision and prophecy, supply all that was wanting to perfect the great scheme of revelation for the instruction of the world, and then die to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.”

Jude 3  “Beloved, while I was giving all diligence to write unto you of our common salvation, I was constrained to write unto you exhorting you to contend earnestly for the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints.” (ASV)

  Here we see that the faith (or Word) was delivered once and for all to the saints (ourselves).   Jamieson-Fausset-Brown Bible Commentary states, “No other faith or revelation is to supersede it. A strong argument for resisting heretical innovators.” 

1 Cor. 4:6 “that you may learn in us not to think beyond what is written, that none of you may be puffed up on behalf of one against the other.” (emphasis added)

  This verse clearly states that what is written is more important than anything anyone says later.  Charles Hodge says, “That is, not to esteem minister above the scriptural standard. As Paul had been dealing with this subject, ‘nothing beyond what is written’ might seem naturally to refer to what he himself had just written. But as the phrase elsewhere always refers to the Old Testament, which were the ‘writings’ recognized as of divine authority, that is probably what he is referring to here.”

1 Corinthians 14:3 “…the one who prophesies speaks to people for their upbuilding and encouragement and consolation.”

  It’s clear that prophecy is for upbuilding and encouragement. 

These verses make clear that God’s Word is already written and that the role of prophecy in the church is for encouragement—not for doctrine.  Thus, we can see that religious experiences, i.e. the ones that are prophetic, are not meant for the creation of new meaning in Christianity.  However, these experiences can and should be uplifting.  

  In most cases, these experiences can change our minds, change our hearts and always remind of us of what is already written in the scriptures. 

  

Conclusion…

  We’ve entered the heart of modern Atheism, empiricism, and argued that we can know that a supernatural realm exists.  This in turn proves that naturalism is false.  This in turn proves that supernaturalism is correct.  Finally, we looked at what the Bible says about modern religious experiences.